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The turn of the European Union (EU) towards the conclusion of mega-regional free 
trade agreements (FTAs) in the past decade signified the beginning of an ambitious 
trade policy. Although initially marked by limited success and civil society opposition 
in certain cases, some of the EU’s mega-regional projects have borne fruits. A recent 
example of such a comprehensive agreement is the EU-Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). Drawing on historical institutionalism, this paper aims to explain why 
the EU negotiates mega-regional FTAs, to illustrate these motivations through a case 
study of the EU-Japan EPA, and to examine likely implications of EU mega-regionals 
for the partners to the agreements, third countries and the multilateral trading system. 
The paper argues that the stalemate of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which 
triggered the 2006 Global Europe Strategy, constitutes a critical juncture that opened 
the path towards mega-regional agreements. Furthermore, the EU’s long-standing 
practice of promoting rules and values in its trade relations, as well as the more recent 
path created by the ‘template’ of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA), contribute to the motivations of 
the EU to conclude mega-regionals. 
In the case of the EU-Japan EPA, agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and CETA acted as 
critical junctures. Power asymmetries and bargaining help explain how the EU and 
Japan succeeded in negotiating a comprehensive EPA, including some pioneering 
elements such as climate change and corporate governance. Among the likely 
implications of EU mega-regionals are positive feedback effects, such as economic 
growth for the partners to the mega-regionals, domino effects inducing non-
members of mega-regionals to join the bloc, as well as the (unintended) 






Introduction: from multilateral trade negotiations to mega-regionals 
 
Bilateral and regional trade agreements have existed alongside the multilateral 
trading system of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for quite some time.1 In recent 
years, despite the WTO Doha Round, the number of such regional agreements has 
been on the rise. For some of the more encompassing, complex and politically 
significant agreements, the term ‘mega-regional’ has been coined. 2 The EU has 
negotiated several mega-regionals, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) or the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement 
(CETA). The TTIP negotiations were launched in 2013, faced significant hurdles and 
ended without conclusion at the end of 2016.3 Despite the uncertainty surrounding 
the policy of the Trump administration and the global slowdown of trade, the EU has 
remained on the path of free trade agreements (FTAs).4 While widely debated in 
policy circles and by the wider public, CETA provisionally entered into force in 
September 2017 and still awaits ratification by some national – and some regional – 
parliaments in EU countries, before it can take full effect.5 Despite the complex and 
long negotiation processes, at times accompanied by civil society opposition, that 
characterise mega-regional agreements, the recent example of the EU-Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) stands out as a successful negotiation of a 
comprehensive agreement between like-minded partners. The EPA is to date the 
biggest trade deal of the EU having fully entered in force.  
 
This paper aims to explore why the EU negotiates such mega-regional agreements, 
to check these motivations in a case study of the EU-Japan EPA, and to discuss how 
these agreements may impact the parties involved, other global actors and the 
multilateral trading system as a whole. It draws on historical institutionalism to explain 
the turn of the EU towards mega-regionals. This theory allows for the study of 
                                                 
1  P.T. Stoll, “Mega-Regionals: Challenges, Opportunities and Research Questions”, in T. 
Rensmann (ed.), Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, Augsburg, Springer, 2017, p. 3. 
2 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
3 European Commission, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), DG Trade, 
updated 15 April 2019, retrieved 20 June 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip. 
4 “Increase in policy uncertainty may account for up to 75 percent of the worsening of the 
trade slowdown in 2016”: C. Constantinescu et al., “Trade Developments in 2016: Policy 
uncertainty weighs on world trade”, World Bank Group, Washington D.C., 21 February 2017, 
p. 7. 
5 European Commission, EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), DG 
Trade, updated 12 April 2019, retrieved 16 July 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ceta. 
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institutional changes from a chronological perspective, taking into account the 
sequence of events. It thus offers a dynamic view of institutional changes over time. 
The different explanatory factors reveal “patterns of institutional reproduction and 
change”.6 The combination of a chronological and institutional approach is also 
particularly useful for the case study of the EU-Japan EPA, as it can provide an 
explanation for the shift in EU-Japan relations, from indifference to a comprehensive 
like-minded partnership.7 At the same time, discussing the origins and likely impacts 
of mega-regionals, and elaborating on the identified motivations through the case 
study of the EU-Japan EPA, may provide possible insights for the path the EU 
policymakers could pursue regarding trade policy in the future. 
 
The paper follows an hourglass structure, as it will move from a general section on the 
motivations behind the negotiation of mega-regionals, to the specific case study of 
the EU-Japan EPA, and then return to a more general section on the likely implications 
of mega-regional FTAs on the bilateral, global and multilateral level.  
 
Framework of analysis 
 
This section briefly introduces the main analytical tools to be used throughout the 
paper. It first provides a definition for the term ‘mega-regional trade agreement’ and 
discuss whether the EU-Japan EPA can be considered as one. It then introduces the 
key concepts of historical institutionalism that will serve as factors to explain the EU’s 
turn towards such comprehensive regional agreements. 
 
What are ‘mega-regionals’? 
 
There are multiple voices in the literature regarding what the first part of the term 
(‘mega-’) entails. According to some definitions, ‘mega’ implies more than two 
partners and would thus mean a plurilateral agreement, such as the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 8  However, an 
agreement between only two partners can also be considered as a mega-regional 
                                                 
6 O. Fioretos, “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations”, International Organisation, 
vol. 65, no. 2, 2011, p. 374 [hereafter, “Fioretos (2011)”]. 
7 F. Waldenberger, “EU-Japan Relations – Past, Present and Future”, Fondation France-Japon 
de l’EHESS Paris, 2019, retrieved 20 June 2020, http://ffj.ehess.fr/index/article/303/eu-japan-
relations-past-present-and-future.html. 




if the partners are very large trading entities, given the economic magnitude of such 
an agreement.9 Riffel argues that “the term ‘mega-regionals’ describes a trend in 
international trade law to negotiate FTAs among countries encompassing a 
considerable share of world trade”. 10  Indeed, mega-regional trade agreements 
have also been defined as “partnerships between countries or regions with a major 
share of world trade and foreign direct investment”, which “beyond simply increasing 
trade links … aim to improve regulatory compatibility and provide a rules-based 
framework for ironing out differences in investment and business climates”. 11 
According to this definition, the term ‘mega’ refers to the size of the economies of 
the negotiating parties, as well as to the high level of ambition.12 Finally, while a study 
for the European Parliament requires that an agreement needs to comprise three or 
more countries or regional groupings in order to be considered a mega-regional, it 
goes on to argue that the EU, comprising 27 countries, meets this criterion in all of its 
bilateral agreements.13  
 
Therefore, the term ‘mega’ does not necessarily imply a plurilateral agreement. For 
the purpose of this paper, a mega-regional trade agreement is a deep integration 
partnership among large economies that is meant to “transform and shape the 
international economic order and ... promote more far-reaching geopolitical 
goals”. 14  As argued for example by Solis and Urata or by Frey, the EU-Japan 
agreement is considered a mega-regional FTA. 15  Furthermore, already the 
Commission’s impact assessment indicated that the “EU-Japan FTA can be seen 
against the broad background of developments in FTAs and in particular the ‘mega-
                                                 
9 Interview with P. Lamprecht, Senior Economist at ECIPE Brussels, 12 February 2019. 
10  C. Riffel, “Encyclopedia Entry: Mega-regionals”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, December 2016, ), updated December 2016, retrieved 2 July 2020, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2177. 
11 T. Hirst, “What are mega-regional trade agreements?”, World Economic Forum, 9 July 2014, 
retrieved 18 June 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/07/trade-what-are-
megaregionals. 
12 P. Lamy, “Is trade multilateralism being threatened by regionalism?”, Adelphi Papers, vol. 
54, no. 450, October 2014, p. 67. 
13 European Parliament, Impacts of the CETA agreement on developing countries, Study - 
EP/EXPO/B/FWC/DEVE/2013-08/Lot5/13, Brussels, February 2017, p. 12. 
14 S. Griller et al., Mega-Regional Trade Agreements New Orientations for EU External Relations, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 3. 
15 M. Solis & S. Urata, “Abenomics and Japan’s Trade Policy in a New Era”, Asian Economic 
Policy Review, January 2018, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 107; C. Frey, “Mega-Regional Trade Agreements 
and Post-2015 Climate Protection: Bridging the Gap”, Journal for European Environmental and 
Planning Law, vol. 12, no. 3-4, 2015, p. 268. 
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regional’ agreements”. 16  As Ponjaert argues, “the sheer size of the economies 
involved makes any trade agreement between Japan and the EU of systemic 
importance”. 17  The EU and Japan together cover one third of the global gross 
domestic product (GDP) and one fifth of global trade, and the EPA is thus so far the 
EU’s biggest FTA to have fully entered into force.18 The EPA covers more than 600 
million people, around 30% of the world GDP and 37% of world trade.19 Next to the 
“traditional” provisions on trade in goods or services, the EPA includes some of the 
“strongest commitments to environmental protection, labour and sustainable 
development ever contained in a trade deal”; what is more, the EPA is the first and 
only international trade agreement to include a clear commitment to fight climate 
change and support the implementation of the Paris Agreement.20  
 
In view of its economic importance and comprehensiveness, the EU-Japan EPA 
qualifies as a mega-regional trade agreement. The following subsection defines 
components of historical institutionalist theory that will then be used to explain why 
the EU negotiates such agreements.  
 
A historical institutionalist approach 
 
According to Fioretos, historical institutionalism redefines its object “from one directed 
at the study of stationary outcomes to one focused on explaining diverse and 
dynamic processes of institutional development”.21 First of all, institutions, according 
to North, are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, … the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction”.22 Applying this definition to a 
trade agreement, whose role it is to shape the rules governing trade relations 
between two partners, allows one to consider such an agreement as a type of 
institution. Thus, the way mega-regional agreements are negotiated, as well as their 
                                                 
16 European Commission, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Free Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and Japan, Final Report, DG Trade, Brussels, 2016, p. 52 
[hereafter, “Impact Assessment”]. 
17 F. Ponjaert, “The Political and Institutional Significance of an EU-Japan Trade and Partnership 
Agreement”, in P. Bacon et al. (eds.), The European Union and Japan: A New Chapter in 
Civilian Power Cooperation?, Surrey, Ashgate Publishing, 2015, p. 86. 
18 Interview with representatives of the Japan Business Council Europe (JBCE), 8 April 2019. 
19 Interview with members of the Delegation of the European Union to Japan in Tokyo (EEAS), 
29 March 2019. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 371. 
22  D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 3. 
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development over time, can be examined through the lens of historical 
institutionalism. The paper will use some of the key elements of this theory, including 
critical junctures, path dependences, the role of power asymmetry, unintended 
consequences, sequence and positive feedback effects. 
 
Critical junctures are “moments where substantial institutional change takes place 
thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical development moves onto 
a new path”.23 If these paths manage to shape “the subsequent trajectory in ways 
that make alternative institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph”, a new 
path dependence is created.24 Path dependences may render a reversal of the 
initial choice difficult.25 When a path towards a certain direction is created, this may 
induce further steps in the same direction, and this “is even more likely when over 
time the relative benefits compared to other options and the costs of exit and policy 
change increase”.26 Regarding institutions as “carriers of history” allows to examine 
how different policies, strategies and patterns of behaviour existing within institutions, 
through time, led towards the mega-regional path.27  
 
Another important concept in historical institutionalism is the role of power 
asymmetry, which occurs when the “power relations present in existing institutions 
give some actors or interests more power than others over the creation of new 
institutions”.28 As Bayne and Woolcock argue, relative economic power is one of the 
factors shaping economic diplomacy and a major determinant of the outcome of 
economic negotiations.29 As one of the biggest markets and trading entities in the 
world, the EU can exert more bargaining power and benefit from the fact that its 
partners may have a stronger desire to conclude an agreement.30 Furthermore, in 
                                                 
23  P.A. Hall & R.C. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political 
Studies, XLIV, 1996, p. 942. 
24 Fioretos (2011), op. cit., p. 376. 
25 M. Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis”, in M. Lichbach & A. Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and 
Structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 28. 
26 S. Gstöhl, “Theoretical Approaches to the European Neighbourhood Policy”, in S. Gstöhl & 
S. Schunz (eds.), Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy, London, Routledge, 2017, p. 
8. 
27  P.A. David, “Why Are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’? Path Dependence and the 
Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions”, Structural Change and Economic 
Dynamics, vol. 5, no. 2, 1994, p. 205. 
28 Hall & Taylor, op. cit., p. 954. 
29 N. Bayne & S. Woolcock, The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and Negotiation 
in International Economic Relations, Surrey, Ashgate, 3rd edn, 2011, p. 6. 
30 Interview with P. Lamprecht, op. cit. 
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the international arena, attention is paid to the sequence in which trade agreements 
are concluded and this ‘sequencing game’ is another important aspect of the 
negotiation process.31 According to historical institutionalist theory, “the sequence of 
political events can have a causal effect for later developments” and therefore 
should be examined, especially because “the order in which things happen can 
affect the interests of political actors, their ability to shape outcomes, and thus also 
the direction of history”.32  
 
Finally, when it comes to the likely implications of mega-regionals, a focus will be 
placed on positive feedback effects, which “exist when the choice of multiple 
individuals generates positive externalities”, leading to a self-reinforcing behaviour 
and the wish to remain on the path that created these effects.33 Moreover, likely 
implications in the form of unintended consequences will also be examined. 
According to Pierson, these occur in situations, where actors that “may be in a strong 
initial position, seek to maximize their interests, and nevertheless carry out institutional 
and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their own positions (or those of their 
successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or undesired”.34  
 
The following section addresses the question why the EU negotiates mega-regional 
agreements. While the motivation behind a given mega-regional agreement is case-
specific and depends on the countries involved and the point in time, some general 
motivations of the EU can be identified in light of historical institutionalism.35 
 
Motivations of the EU to negotiate mega-regionals 
 
This section first argues that the stalemate in the WTO triggering the EU’s 2006 Global 
Europe Strategy was a critical juncture leading to the creation of the mega-regional 
path. Second, the EU’s traditional dependence on its values-based, standard-setting 
path, as well as a new path dependence since CETA will be discussed. Third, the 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Fioretos (2011), op. cit., pp. 381, 382. 
33 Ibid., p. 377. 
34  P. Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, 1996, p. 126. 
35 S. Schwab & K. Bhatia, “The Rationale behind Mega-regionals – Two Views”, in Mega-
regional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading 
System?, Report, World Economic Forum, July 2014, p. 18. 
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paper elaborates on the role of power asymmetries and bargaining, shedding light 
on deeper integration ambitions and economic motivations. 
 
Critical juncture: from Doha 2001 to ‘Global Europe’ 2006 
 
The concept of critical juncture can be understood as a “turning point”, a moment 
of “structural indeterminacy and fluidity” allowing for options of institutional 
innovation.36 The motivation of the EU to shift towards mega-regional agreements will 
be elaborated as a consequence of a critical juncture leading to the mega-regional 
path: the stagnation of the Doha Development Round, which triggered the European 
Commission’s 2006 Global Europe Strategy. 
 
One of the main motivations for the EU and other actors to pursue the mega-regional 
path is the fact that, since the Doha Development Round failed to produce 
significant results in liberalising trade, alternative ways towards liberalisation needed 
to be found.37 This negotiation deadlock in the WTO led to a major shift towards 
bilateral FTAs. Interestingly, since the Mongolia-Japan agreement of February 2015, 
there is not a single member of the WTO that is not party to a preferential trade 
agreement. 38  This situation left the world trade landscape with a dense web of 
agreements and a complex interplay among multiple trade regimes.39 In order to 
increase clarity and consistency, but also to help in transforming the international 
economic order despite the paralysis in the WTO, the mega-regional path was 
opened to “plurilateralise” this complex web of bilateral agreements. 40 Thus, the 
Doha stalemate marked a “branching point” at a critical juncture.41  
 
Since 1999 the EU was following the so-called ‘Lamy doctrine’ ‒ named after the EU 
Trade Commissioner at that time ‒, which introduced a moratorium on the conclusion 
of bilateral FTAs in order to demonstrate the EU’s commitment to the multilateral 
trading system and the new WTO round.42 However, by 2005, it became clear that an 
                                                 
36 G. Capoccia, “Critical Junctures”, in O. Fioretos et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Historical Institutionalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 89, 101. 
37 M.S. Akman, “Global Trade Governance and G20: A Response to Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements”, Rising Powers Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, 2016, p. 85. 
38 Frey, op. cit., p. 267. 
39 Lamy, op. cit., p. 61; Griller, op. cit., p. 5. 
40 Griller, op. cit., pp. 5, 7. 
41 Hall & Taylor, op. cit., p. 942. 
42 S. Gstöhl & D. De Bièvre, The Trade Policy of the European Union, London, Palgrave, 2018, p. 
129. 
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agreement would not be in sight, despite EU efforts to satisfy the demands of 
developing countries.43 Thus, in 2006, the EU stated in its “Global Europe - Competing 
in the World” strategy that, while remaining committed to multilateralism and the 
WTO, it would implement a more strategic bilateral approach.44 This Communication 
produced a shift in the EU’s broader trade policy orientation and many of the 
regulatory issues that the EU tried to address through the Doha Round became 
instead the subject of bilateral or regional agreements. 45  At the core of these 
ambitious agreements is the aim to increase the market potential of the EU, while 
exporting regulatory standards and promoting “a model of development based on 
sustainability standards and human rights”.46  
 
The EU’s commitment to remain on this path was recently reaffirmed by Trade 
Commissioner Hogan who underlined the importance of reinforcing even “stronger 
alliances with like-minded partners”, especially in light of current challenges which 
include the Covid-19 response.47 The model of “open strategic autonomy” that the 
EU wishes to follow includes getting the maximum from the network of EU trade 
deals. 48  This demonstrates what will be elaborated in the following subsection, 
namely a path dependence of the EU in pursuing a strategy of concluding 
comprehensive mega-regional FTAs, in order to set innovative standards. 
 
Path dependence: standard-setting and the ‘CETA template’ 
 
Further motivations of the EU to conclude mega-regionals can be found in certain 
path dependences, also taking into account the importance of sequence.  
 
Besides economic gains, the wish to set global standards is a core motivation for the 
conclusion of mega-regionals. EU trade policy falls under Art. 21 TEU, which lays down 
                                                 
43 A. Poletti & D. Sicurelli, The Political Economy of Normative Trade Power Europe, Cham, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 24.  
44 European Commission, Global Europe Competing in the World: A contribution to the EU’s 
growth and jobs strategy, COM(2006) 567 final, Brussels, 4 October 2006, pp. 8-10 [hereafter, 
“Global Europe”]. 
45 Poletti & Sicurelli, op. cit., p. 24. 
46 Ibid., p. 16.  
47 P. Hogan, Speech at Launch of Public Consultation for EU Trade Policy Review, EUI Florence, 






the principles upon which EU external action is based: democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, solidarity and the promotion of multilateral solutions. 49  “Trade 
negotiations represent a preferential arena for the EU to emerge as a normative 
leader internationally” also for the EU’s ambitions to conclude mega-regional 
agreements.50 A trade agenda promoting sustainable development, human rights 
and good governance, and, in that sense, consistency of trade policy with other 
areas of the EU’s external action, is at the core of the EU ‘Trade for all’ strategy of 
2015. 51  Two years later, the European Commission highlights the importance of 
“safeguarding high European standards of environmental, consumer, social and 
labour protection as well as fundamental rights without compromise”.52 In the 2017 
Communication, the EU remains on the mega-regional, bilateral path by expanding 
its partnerships to Australia and New Zealand.53 Mega-regional agreements do not 
simply seek to increase trade between the partners at the bilateral or regional level. 
They also have the potential to (at least partly) fill the gap that was created with the 
stalemate at the WTO. An inherent value of two large trading entities coming 
together in a bilateral mega-regional agreement is to define among themselves 
standards, which could be exported to third parties.54 Thus, standard setting is an 
important motivation behind negotiating mega-regional agreements.  
 
The sequence of events is a very useful factor to explain trade negotiations and in 
particular the efforts to set standards. In the international arena, attention is paid to 
the order in which agreements are negotiated and deals are made. For instance, 
post-Brexit the UK will find itself at the back end of the sequence of trade agreements, 
and, given its smaller size, its bargaining power vis-à-vis other countries will be weaker 
compared to the EU’s.55 On the flipside of this coin is the need to be among the first 
in the sequence, in order to define the rules of the game before others do so. “It is 
easier to help write rules now than to accede to them later”, where there is much less 
room for the promotion of one’s interests.56  
                                                 
49 European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of 
the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012, Art. 21 TEU. 
50 Poletti & Sicurelli, op. cit., p. 15. 
51 European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a more Responsible Trade and Investment 
Policy, COM(2015) 497 final, 19 October 2015, p. 15. 
52 European Commission, A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation, 
COM(2017) 492 final, Brussels, 13 September 2017, p. 4 [hereafter, “Communication 2017”]. 
53 Ibid., p. 2. 
54 Interview with P. Lamprecht, op. cit. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Schwab & Bhatia, op. cit., p. 19. 
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Furthermore, CETA has created a new path dependence for the EU in the 
negotiations of mega-regionals by serving as a ‘template’ for future agreements.57 In 
2016 EU Trade Commissioner Malmström considered CETA to constitute a model of 
EU agreements.58 When CETA was created, it was “in all probability the most lengthy 
and complex FTA ever drafted”, including provisions on sustainable development, 
environmental and labour standards, and the regulation of e-commerce. 59  The 
French Minister of State for Foreign Trade in 2016, Matthias Fekl, argued that the 
provisions of CETA should serve as a template for other ambitious EU agreements, 
such as TTIP, which was still under negotiation in April 2016, when CETA was 
concluded.60 In essence, CETA was the first in a line of EU agreements, for which the 
term “new generation FTAs” has been coined, as they contain, “in addition to the 
classical provisions on the reduction of customs duties and of non-tariff barriers …, 
provisions on … intellectual property protection, investment, public procurement, 
competition and sustainable development”. 61  CETA created a path the EU has 
followed for the negotiation of its subsequent ambitious agreements.62 Therefore, 
CETA also acted as a critical juncture, creating a new path for the EU’s pursuit of the 
ambitious, mega-regional path.  
 
The role of power asymmetries and economic motivations 
 
Power asymmetry plays a significant role in bilateral FTAs, where the EU, given its 
economic significance, can exert more bargaining power vis-à-vis smaller partners. 
Even though mega-regionals are negotiated among relatively equal partners, there 
                                                 
57  Example for the ‘template’ characterisation: F. Simon, “France sees the EU-Canada 
agreement as a ‘template’ for TTIP”, euractiv, 8 March 2016, retrieved 15 June 2020, 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/france-sees-the-eu-canada-
agreement-as-a-template-for-ttip. 
58  C. Malmström, “Signing our trade agreement with Canada”, Blog post – European 
Commission, 30 October 2016, retrieved 16 July 2020, https://www.europa-
nu.nl/id/vk8rc7cj14zz/nieuws/signing_our_trade_agreement_with_canada?ctx=vhyzn0ozwm
z1&tab=0. 
59 A. De Mestral, “When Does the Exception Become the Rule? Conserving Regulatory Space 
under CETA”, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2015, pp. 641, 
642. 
60 cited in Simon, op. cit. 
61 Court of Justice of the European Union, The free trade agreement with Singapore cannot, 
in its current form, be concluded by the EU alone, Press Release no. 52/17, Luxembourg, 16 
May 2017. 
62  S. Chowdry et al., “The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement”, Bruegel Special 
Report, Brussels, 28 September 2018, retrieved 14 July 2020, http://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/EXPO_STU2018603880_EN.pdf, p. 8. 
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are still certain asymmetries depending on specific aspects or policy areas. While the 
bargaining power asymmetries may be smaller between equal partners, reaching an 
agreement can be all the more invaluable, as the EU cannot “dictate terms”, but has 
to accept “the prospect of meaningful concessions” to gain improved access to 
another large market; this “raises the stakes” for the parties and can offer a 
motivation to engage in mega-regional talks. 63  Space is therefore provided to 
negotiate and reach an agreement that goes deeper and touches upon various 
issues that exceed the traditional tariff-only agreements.  
 
The bilateral approach constitutes a further motivation to negotiate mega-regionals 
for two reasons: first, because it allows the EU to adopt a more ambitious attitude and 
open up the scope of the agreement together with its like-minded partner, and, 
second, because this ambitious approach allows for substantial economic and 
commercial gains. 
 
The power play and negotiation tactics when only two players are involved allow for 
a broadening of the areas covered by an agreement. This is even more crucial 
because of the impossibility to achieve such an ambitious scope within the WTO. And 
even if the Doha Round had not failed, the WTO might still not be the most adequate 
arena to pursue broader issues, such as regulatory aspects and important ‘behind-
the-border’ measures: “existing WTO rules and member-specific obligations are 
perceived as being unsatisfactory, as they often tend to reflect the lowest common 
denominator”.64 At the multilateral level, there are areas not appropriately covered 
yet, such as trade in services, investments, technical standards, and regulatory issues 
(referred to as WTO+ and WTO-x, see below). 65  Behind this lack of multilateral 
coverage are the consensus-based processes at the WTO, as, according to the 
‘single undertaking’ principle, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. 66 
Therefore, outside of the WTO the “transaction costs for negotiating a wider agenda 
shall be lower”.67 Potential hubs created by mega-regionals could open the way 
towards provisions of unprecedented scope, ranging from intellectual property and 
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65 Akman, op. cit., p. 88. 
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labour standards to environment, climate change or food security. This is why Velut 
refers to mega-regionals as “no longer confined to trade and investment, but … (as) 
international regulatory regimes in their own right”. 68  In an increasingly 
interconnected economy, with the nature of economic exchange developing and 
taking new forms, behind-the-border issues are extremely important to address.69 
Therefore, the EU has a strong motivation to ride the new wave of digital globalization 
and demonstrate its awareness that former trends in financial and trade flows are 
being overshadowed by “the exponential growth of global data flows”.70 Within this 
context, the EU is particularly motivated to follow the mega-regional path because 
of the opportunity to address non-trade concerns, such as sustainable development 
and climate change.  
 
At the same time, a key motivation to negotiate mega-regionals are the economic 
and commercial gains of the partners to such an agreement.71 The economic impact 
of mega-regional initiatives is significant, considering that often major actors 
negotiate these agreements which represent a substantial share of the world GDP.72 
Furthermore, such agreements can improve the competitiveness of industries for both 
sides of the deal. All in all, the overall positive welfare effects serve as one of the core 




So far, it has been argued that the EU negotiates mega-regional trade agreements 
for a number of political, economic and systemic/institutional reasons. The stalemate 
in the WTO Doha Development Round triggering the subsequent 2006 Global Europe 
strategy was identified as a critical juncture. Moreover, the EU’s standard-setting 
approach through its trade policy, as well as the use of CETA as a template were 
identified as important path dependences, keeping the EU at the forefront of the 
sequencing game and acting as substantial motivations for the conclusion of mega-
regionals. Finally, the role of power asymmetries has been elaborated, as the 
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bargaining game with like-minded partners allows the EU to adopt a much wider 
scope of provisions, while enabling deeper economic benefits to be reaped by both 
partners.  
 
The following case study illustrates these motivations by discussing to what extent they 
are valid in the case of the EU-Japan EPA. It complements the analysis with additional 
elements that are specific for this case. 
 
EU-Japan EPA: A historical institutionalist case study 
 
First of all, it will be examined to what extent previous mega-regionals and especially 
CETA, but also TTIP and TPP have acted as a critical juncture, creating a path towards 
the conclusion of the EU-Japan EPA. Second, the importance of the sequence of 
events will be illustrated by discussing the role of Brexit and the EU-South Korea FTA. 
The path dependence of the EU as promoter of values and standard setter will be 
elaborated against the background of a rising China and of the protectionism 
advocated for by the Trump administration. Third, the role of power asymmetry in 
trade negotiations will be highlighted by analysing the comprehensive agreement 
achieved. 
 
TTIP, TPP and CETA as a critical juncture for the EPA 
 
As discussed above, critical junctures are “initial markers of path-dependent 
processes”.74 It will be argued that TPP and TTIP, and in particular the withdrawal of 
the US from both, pushed the EU and Japan towards the path of concluding the EPA, 
after a period of ‘functional distance’ between them.75  
 
TTIP is well suited to illustrate the positioning of Japan vis-à-vis the US. Historically, there 
has been a “deeply embedded American bias” in Japanese economic and security 
relations, and for this reason, Suzuki argues that “Japanese trade relations have been 
and will be decided through the prism of US-Japanese relations”.76 When the US 
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approached the EU to negotiate TTIP, this was a “wake up call for Japan” to engage 
in discussions with the EU.77 Furthermore, TTIP motivated Japan to participate in the 
TPP negotiations, as a successful EU-US deal without the participation of Japan in TPP 
would reduce Japan’s importance and its overall position in global trade.78 Japan 
first entered into TPP negotiations in July 2013. 79  Prime Minister Abe had initially 
prioritized TPP negotiations over all other trade initiatives, as part of his ‘Abenomics’ 
policy, which, among others, envisaged reaching a total share of trade covered by 
FTAs of 70% by 2018, from 19% in 2013.80 After the withdrawal of the US from TPP in 
January 2017, Japan could no longer reach the 70% target.81 At the same time, the 
“new regional economic architecture” in the Asia-Pacific centred on TPP was 
projected to negatively affect the EU, if the EU would not conclude an FTA with 
Japan.82 Thus, according to the Commission’s trade sustainability impact assessment 
for the EU-Japan EPA, the EU needed to improve its access to the Japan market in 
order to retain its current level of economic benefits from trade.83  
 
The failure of TTIP reinforced the critical juncture for the EU to pursue the path towards 
the conclusion of an agreement with Japan. Moreover, TPP and the withdrawal of 
the US also pushed Japan and the EU closer together, demonstrating their need to 
step up and create the rules of the game among them. Thus, both TTIP and TPP acted 
as a critical juncture opening the path towards the EU-Japan EPA.  
 
Moreover, the previous section of this paper argued that CETA has served as a 
template for subsequent EU trade agreements. To assess whether this argument is 
valid in the case of the EU-Japan EPA, I will compare the two agreements with regard 
to their WTO+ (building on existing WTO commitments) and their WTO-x commitments 
(issues beyond WTO’s current scope).84  
 
                                                 
77 R. Tyszkiewicz, “Towards New Political and Economic Agreements with Japan: Bringing New 
Dynamism into the Strategic Partnership between the EU and Japan”, PISM Policy Paper, vol. 
57, no. 9, April 2013, p. 3. 
78 Tyszkiewicz, op. cit., p. 3. 
79 Y. Watanabe, “The Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) and its Potentials”, 
ECIPE Seminar, Brussels, 22 November 2018, retrieved 17 June 2020, https://ecipe.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/EU-Japan-EPA-ECIPE-Seminar-22-11-18-Prof.-Watanabe.pdf, p. 11. 
80 Solis & Urata, op. cit., pp. 106, 113. 
81 Ibid., pp. 113-114. 
82 European Commission, Impact Assessment, op. cit., pp. 49, 248. 
83 Ibid., p. 49. 
84 Chowdry, op. cit., pp. 8, 22 et seq. 
Tatiana Kakara 
 18 
Regarding WTO+ issues, CETA and the EU-Japan agreement are similar in their high 
degree of commitments on services trade, technical barriers, public procurement 
and intellectual property.85 Both differ, however, substantially from older agreements 
(e.g. CARIFORUM or Israel), as, they cover new policy areas, such as trade-related 
investment measures and the elimination of export taxes. 86  This supports the 
argument that CETA indeed set a precedent. 
 
Concerning WTO-x commitments, both agreements pursue the objective of 
expanding market access, while “promoting equitable and sustainable trade”, as 
they include provisions on environmental law and labour market regulations. 87 
Moreover, both CETA and the EU-Japan EPA include provisions specific to small and 
medium-sized enterprises, as well as cooperation on research, technologies and 
energy.88 A novelty of the EU-Japan EPA is its mention of the commitments under the 
Paris Agreement, as well as a chapter dedicated to corporate governance.89  
 
There is, however, one key difference between the EU-Japan EPA and CETA, as the 
EPA only covers issues under the exclusive competence of the EU and requires 
approval from the Council and ratification by the European Parliament.90 CETA, on 
the other hand, covers portfolio investment and investor protection disciplines and is 
therefore a mixed agreement, which must be approved by national and regional 
parliaments, according to Singapore Opinion 2/15 of the European Court of Justice.91 
Concretely, CETA was the first EU trade agreement to replace the earlier Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism with the Investment Court System (ICS).92 
The Singapore Opinion set a precedent for the EU, opening the path of splitting 
investment agreements from the FTAs in the future, in order to facilitate the FTA’s 
ratification. Therefore, in the case of the EU-Japan EPA, while the trade agreement 
has entered into force, an agreement on investment is still under negotiation, as 
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Japan prefers the ISDS mechanism and not the ICS proposed by the EU.93 Overall, 
with the exception of this last point, it is safe to conclude that the provisions of CETA 
have to a large extent been replicated in the EU-Japan EPA. Therefore, CETA indeed 
created a template for the EU-Japan case. 
 
Beyond CETA: Brexit, South Korea and the importance of sequencing for the EPA 
 
The sequence of events, meaning the order in which things happen, can “affect the 
interests of political actors” and shape the direction of subsequent developments.94 
Beyond the CETA template, case-specific motivations for  the EU-Japan EPA were the 
2016 Brexit referendum and the EU-South Korea FTA signed in 2010, which 
demonstrate the role of sequence of events pushing the EU and Japan closer to each 
other.  
 
Apart from the withdrawal of the US from TPP, the EU-Japan negotiations have also 
been pushed by Brexit.95 While Brexit may have contributed, as will be shown, to the 
negotiations with Japan, in the case of TTIP it made an agreement with the ‘EU minus 
the UK’ less attractive to the US.96  
 
For Japan, on the other hand, the UK is an important base for Japanese firms in 
Europe, such as the motorcar industry (Nissan-Renault, Toyota and Honda) operating 
plants in the country.97 Many of the more than one thousand UK-based Japanese 
companies consider the possibility of relocating to EU territory to adapt post-Brexit.98 
Brexit further demonstrates how the sequence of events plays a substantial role. Both 
Japan and the EU wished to conclude the EPA before the UK entered a transition 
phase on 31 January 2020, in order to use the EPA as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the 
                                                 
93 P.A. Nelson, “Taking the Lead in Current and Future Trade Relationships”, in A. Berkofsky et 
al. (eds.), The EU-Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China: The Crisis of Liberalism, London, 
Routledge, 2018, p. 130. For more information on the benefits of ICS over ISDS see Chowdry, 
op. cit., pp. 18-19.  
94 Fioretos (2011), op. cit., p. 382. 
95 Gstöhl & De Bièvre, op. cit., p. 153. 
96 Young, op. cit., p. 112. 
97 Suzuki, op. cit., p. 885. 
98 K. Holton, “More Japanese companies could leave UK over Brexit – ambassador”, Reuters, 




UK. 99  For the EU the agreement served as a demonstration of strength in its 
negotiations with the British government.100 For Japan, a deal with the EU is also a 
bargaining chip, which can buy it more time to negotiate a separate trade 
agreement with the UK.101  
 
A further case in point for the significance of the sequence of events is the EU-South 
Korea FTA, the first EU trade agreement with an Asian country, which entered into 
force in July 2011.102 The market access granted to Korean firms in the EU under the 
FTA challenged Japanese business interests, especially those competing with Korean 
firms in European markets for electronics and automobiles, which through the FTA 
had gained a competitive advantage.103 Thus, the EU–South Korea FTA has created 
momentum, mobilising Japan and the EU to achieve at least a similar agreement.104 
The unprecedented economic impact of the ‘triple disasters’ of 2011 in Japan ‒ the 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown in Fukushima ‒ added to the 
pressure to negotiate the EPA.105 On the whole, the FTA with South Korea was a major 
catalyst for the advancement of the EU-Japan EPA, setting into motion a domino 
effect that brought Japan and the EU closer to an agreement.106 
 
Path dependence and the influence of China and Trump 
 
The EU’s values-based, standard-setting approach has been identified above as an 
important path dependence that can explain the motivations of the EU to conclude 
mega-regionals. This section examines how China and the US influenced the EU’s and 
Japan’s chosen path. 
 
China became a member of the WTO in 2001.107 Ever since, despite expectations to 
the contrary, China has become less of a market economy and more state-
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dominated, creating significant irritants to trade, including industrial subsidies, state-
owned enterprises and overcapacity issues. 108  Even though they do not often 
explicitly refer to China in their interactions, both the EU and Japan are affected by 
Chinese attempts to reshape global economic governance and to reform institutions 
such as the World Bank, the WTO or the International Monetary Fund.109 China seeks 
to create new networks with its ‘Belt and Road initiative’ and a number of regional 
and bilateral trade deals.110 The rise of China has been identified as a challenge for 
the US, referred to as “avoiding the Thucydides trap”.111 In this context, Japan has as 
a US ally been taking a zero-sum approach towards Beijing, whereas the EU 
recognises the growing role of China in global economic governance and wishes to 
positively engage with it, always “with emphasis on rules and regulations that China 
should comply with”.112  
 
The US, an ally of both the EU and Japan, has been following a more and more 
protectionist approach, resetting US trade policy and challenging the multilateral 
system of the WTO by ‘trade wars’ and by blocking the appointment of judges at its 
Appellate Body.113 To reduce bilateral trade deficits, the US increasingly uses tariffs 
and quotas as a tool.114 By contrast, Japan and the EU, having benefitted from 
openness so far, are making the case against this rise of protectionism.  
 
Power asymmetry and the EPA 
 
The EU and Japan are among the four largest economies in the world.115 When it 
comes to the export of goods, the deal was comparatively more important for Tokyo, 
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as 10% of Japanese exports go to the EU, which is more than twice the amount of EU 
goods exported to Japan. 116  Furthermore, the withdrawal of the US from TPP 
negatively influenced the Japanese position, as “preferential U.S. market access in 
Japan would provide Tokyo with additional leverage over its European 
counterparts”.117 At the same time, the sequence of events and previous agreements 
influenced concessions on both sides. On the one hand, Japan conceded to tariff 
reductions on chocolate and pasta, as it had previously done in TPP.118 The EU’s 
concessions to Japan, on the other hand, resemble those in the EU-South Korea 
FTA.119  
 
Yet, all things considered, it was rather the convergence of interests that motivated 
the two sides to achieve a comprehensive agreement. This is in line with the general 
motivations identified above, where it has been concluded that a mega-regional 
can be all the more comprehensive, the stronger the convergence of interests and 
domestic agendas of the two sides.120 This was indeed the case for the EU and Japan, 
achieving a transformation from “de-facto business-driven integration” to “de-jure 
EPA-driven integration”.121  
 
Even though the EU uses the term ‘EPA’ for agreements with the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific states, the EU-Japan agreement is called EPA instead of FTA because 
Japan uses the term for its recent trade agreements that include many issues, such 
as trade in goods, trade in services, direct investment, government procurement, 
intellectual property and competition,122 as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 Elements of a Japanese FTA and the EU-Japan EPA 
 
Source: Watanabe, op. cit., p. 5. 
 
Simplistically referred to as the “cars for cheese” deal, the EPA decreases Japan’s 
tariffs on meat, wine and dairy products in return for an end to EU import duties on 
Japanese cars.123 In terms of liberalisation, “97% of tariff lines and 99% of imports from 
Europe are liberalised and on the 3% of tariff lines not fully liberalised, Japan has given 
the EU significant concessions in terms of tariff rate quotas and/or tariff reductions”.124 
According to the European Commission, “by removing billions of euros of duties, 
simplifying customs procedures and tackling behind-the-border barriers to trade, [the 
EPA] will offer opportunities for companies on both sides to boost their exports and 
expand their business”.125 Going beyond its economic provisions, the agreement also 
has significant non-economic implications on sustainability, labour and climate 
change.126 The EPA will further enable the EU and Japan to shape the course of 
global developments, reflecting their values and “their commitment to a rules-based 
global trade system and the fight against global warming”.127 Indeed, as Yeo argues, 
in partnership, the EU and Japan are able to “leverage on each other’s capacities” 
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An untapped potential in the relations between the EU and Japan, both politically 
and economically, was at the core of the decision to engage in negotiations for a 
trade agreement.129 The case study confirmed that the motivations identified above 
also apply to the EU-Japan EPA. More specifically, it has been shown that TTIP, TPP 
and CETA served as a critical juncture towards the negotiation and conclusion of the 
EU-Japan EPA. The crucial role of sequence has been shown with the examples of 
Brexit and the EU-South Korea FTA. Path dependences were discussed against the 
background of a rising China and the uncertainty surrounding the policy of the Trump 
administration. Finally, this section elaborated how relative power asymmetries 
between the two large economies allowed for a comprehensiveness deal. 
 
In the global context of rising protectionism and geopolitical uncertainties, the EPA 
sends a signal that the EU and Japan stand together for sustainable cooperation and 
for preserving the benefits of openness.130 Finally, a stronger EU-Japan partnership 
could also reinforce the strength and capacity needed to potentially reinvigorate 
the multilateral trading system.131 This, along with other potential impacts of mega-
regional agreements for the parties, for the ‘outsiders’ (non-parties to the 
agreements) and for the multilateral trading system, will be elaborated in the 
subsequent section.  
 
Likely implications of EU mega-regionals 
 
As the spread of EU mega-regional agreements is a recent phenomenon, evidence 
of the effects of such agreements is still inconclusive. 132  Furthermore, these new 
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agreements have been designed as “living agreements” because regulatory 
cooperation is supposed to continue after the conclusion of the negotiations.133 What 
is more, as has been established above, mega-regionals are very comprehensive 
agreements, going beyond tariffs into writing “rules that underpin global value 
chains”.134 This, in turn, renders the analysis of the implications of mega-regionals all 
the more challenging, as these new agreements, according to Velut, blur the 
boundaries between regionalism and multilateralism, have substantial economic 
significance and can potentially set new precedents for worldwide regulation.135  
 
Implications for ‘insiders’: positive feedback effects and path dependence 
 
The path of mega-regional agreements can create ‘positive feedback effects’, 
which in turn render a departure from the path less likely and ultimately contribute to 
a given path dependence. 136  The opening of markets and the reduction and 
elimination of tariffs can bring significant economic benefits to both sides of an 
agreement. Mega-regionals facilitate existing and build new trade patterns, while 
achieving a “higher common-denominator trade agreements”, setting standards 
and proactively responding to challenges.137 On a global level, the large number of 
preferential agreements, which include a multiplicity of rules and tariffs, have been 
described by Bhagwati as a “spaghetti bowl effect” since the agreements are 
“intertwined and reaching out to different directions”. 138  Thus, a further positive 
feedback effect of mega-regionals is organising this spaghetti bowl, or what Baldwin 
describes as “making the spaghetti into lasagne plates”.139 As Schwab and Bhatia 
put it, mega-regionals “may be the inevitable direction taken by like-minded 
countries in a globalized world”.140  
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Implications for ‘outsiders’: domino effects and unintended consequences 
 
The likely impact of mega-regional agreements for ‒ especially smaller ‒ non-
members to the agreements concern potentially discriminatory effects. 141  In 
particular developing and least developed countries fear that their interests will be 
overlooked by large trading powers in smaller groups and that mega-regional 
agreements are not sufficiently inclusive.142 In response to this, it may be argued that 
there are positive spill-over effects for third countries “thanks to increased economic 
activity and the overall reduction in the number of standards that require adaptation 
of third-country companies”.143 
 
Moreover, the mega-regional trend could eventually motivate other countries to 
participate and conclude comprehensive agreements of their own. According to 
Cai, “being involved in the process of mega-negotiations undoubtedly benefits 
China by providing chances for it to abide by and create new rules”.144 As the 
negotiations at the WTO are not progressing, mega-regionals can regulate issues 
such as cross-border data flows or investment protection, with the hope that these 
regulations will become global standards.145 If the EU and its partners succeed as 
standard-setters, this could create a “domino effect”146 if the conclusion of a mega-
regional agreement induces non-members to join the trade bloc. 147  In essence, 
countries could adopt the competitive trade-liberalising standards if they see that 
negotiations going on around them create the risk of them being “locked out”, at a 
competitive disadvantage.148  
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A further question related to this effect is whether the EU mega-deals can provide an 
“incentive structure” for the US’s return to open and comprehensive trade deals.149 
Trump’s protectionism is a highly political tool meant to achieve short-term 
advantages and eventually get re-elected: “with protectionism you can create 
domestic manufacturing, you can pull inward FDI [foreign direct investment], you can 
bring manufacturing business back home”. 150  The rise of protectionism might be 
further enhanced by mega-regionals because, unintendendly, they may “encroach 
too much on the regulatory freedom of national legislatures. If those legislatures are 
democratically legitimized, the conclusion of ever more integrative agreements 
might come into conflict with the principle of democracy”. 151  Moreover, 
Vandenbusche observes a cultural shift in the younger generation, coupled with the 
evolution of societies: people today have seen the world and seem to be valuing the 
local sourcing patterns more; “we care about higher values in life, once our material 
values have been satisfied”, forgetting that the growth of today is thanks to the global 
value chains and globalisation.152 All in all, for the first time in 75 years, “there is no 
international consensus in support of trade”.153 Against this background, it might be 
more difficult than in the past for mega-regionals to achieve the domino effects and 
the global standards-setting envisaged. 
 
Finally, the departure of the UK from the EU also means a withdrawal from its mega-
regionals. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the UK will lose its preferential access to 53 non-EU markets, 
including the access granted under mega-regional agreements.154 Concluding new 
trade agreements with non-EU countries might be more modest in content and take 
long to finalise.155 Moreover, as explained above, due to the sequencing game and 
asymmetrical bargaining power, the UK will find itself “at the back end of the 
sequence of trade”.156 Thus, it will be unable to “demand the type of market access 
concessions and regulatory reforms the EU typically secures in the context of its own 
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trade negotiations”. 157  If mega-regionals are successful in competing with other 
standards around the world, they can create the regulatory rules that the UK would 
have to adhere to, given its limited bargaining power outside of the EU. Thus, post-
Brexit the UK might have to “subscribe to a set of rules that have been developed by 
a small number of trade powers, including, ironically, the EU”, essentially turning the 
UK “from a rule-maker to a rule-taker”.158 
 
Unintended consequences for the multilateral trading system 
 
Mega-regionals are comprehensive agreements, ultimately aiming at rewriting the 
rules of trade. Analysts have inquired to what extent this rule-writing among a few 
countries poses a threat to the multilateral trading system, that is, whether 
comprehensive trade agreements constitute “steppingstones or stumbling blocks to 
multilateralism”.159  
 
This paper has established the stalemate of the Doha Development Round as a 
critical juncture opening the path towards mega-regional agreements. However, as 
Hoekman argues, “the lack of progress in the Doha Round should not be taken to 
imply lack of relevance of the WTO”.160 This has been explicitly defended by the EU. 
The 2006 Global Europe strategy declares that “there will be no European retreat from 
multilateralism”. 161  Moreover, the 2017 EC Communication affirms that “the EU’s 
multilateral obligations in the WTO are the basis of [the EU’s] trade relations around 
the world”.162 
 
According to a first approach, analysts suggest that mega-regionals and 
multilateralism can indeed coexist, with the former taking steps towards the 
advancement of the latter. Research of the OECD suggests that, especially with 
reference to WTO+ measures, provisions in regional agreements have become “more 
widespread and similar over time”, suggesting not just that these agreements have 
the capacity to achieve higher levels of commitment, but also that they create 
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potential to serve as “building blocks for future multilateral policy-making”.163 The 
analysis of the World Economic Forum also suggests that mega-regionals can create 
“potential precedents for future multilateral agreements”.164  Finally, according to the 
WTO, regional and multilateral initiatives are complementary and can “coexist and 
cohere in a kind of ‘multispeed’ or ‘variable geometry’ system” of global trade 
architecture. 165 
 
However a second approach argues that mega-regionals could undermine the 
multilateral trading system. Today’s nature of trade obstacles, as Lamy points out, has 
moved from traditional trade barriers (i.e. tariffs) to differences in standards and 
regulatory regimes. 166  By ‘preferentially’ leveling the playing field between the 
partners to a mega-regional, the EU would essentially create a “bloc that benefits 
insiders more than outsiders”.167 Thus, concluding EU mega-regionals could have as 
an unintended consequence the undermining of the centrality of the WTO.168  
 
To avoid this, mega-regionals ought to be designed with an “open architecture” that 
allows for third countries to eventually become members.169 To further facilitate the 
relationship between mega-regionals and multilateralism, a “supervisory role over 
regulatory convergence” could be given to the WTO.170 Best practice exchanges 
have also been suggested as an invaluable way of ‘multilateralising’ WTO+ and WTO-
x issues, along with confidence-building measures to improve the capacities and 
infrastructure of third countries, facilitating regulatory cooperation.171  
 
A third approach to the effects of mega-regionals for the multilateral trading system 
has been put forward by Baldwin: for larger markets staying outside the mega-
regionals, the “soft preferences arising from the mega-regionals may not prove very 
damaging”, given that larger outsiders “can use their market size and unilateral 
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harmonization to offset the negative effects”.172 For smaller outsiders, the domino 
effect described above, pushing them to participate in the mega-regionals, is a 
probable scenario; “live and let live within this two-pillar system is a very likely 
outcome”.173 
 
Within this complexity, only a few members of mega-regionals alone might not be 
enough to address crucial international issues, such as climate change.174 To mitigate 
possible unintended consequences of mega-regionals undermining the multilateral 
system, it is necessary to create an infrastructure that allows for the rules decided 
among mega-regional partners to be adopted by many more. At the same time, 
multilateralism at the WTO is not and should not be power-based, it is about giving 
small actors equal chances.175 It remains to be seen how mega-regional agreements, 
such as the EU-Japan EPA, can find their way into the multilateral trading system 
without leaving anyone behind. As Lamy rightly puts it, “connecting the bilateral and 




This section found that mega-regional FTAs can have positive feedback effects for 
the partners to the agreements, as opening the markets can lead to significant 
economic benefits, and allow the EU and other like-minded partners to create new 
trade patterns and set global standards which can (proactively) respond to global 
issues such as climate change, sustainability goals or labour rights. At the same time, 
these ambitious standards could lead to domino effects, inducing non-members to 
join the bloc. Finally, the section discussed (unintended) consequences for the 
multilateral trading system and the open architecture these agreements need so that 
they may co-exist without undermining the multilateral system of the WTO. 
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Conclusions: what future for mega-regionals? 
 
Drawing on historical institutionalism, the present work examined why the EU 
negotiates mega-regionals and what the likely implications of such agreements are. 
The study found that the EU turned towards the mega-regional path due to the 
critical juncture of the WTO stalemate which triggered the EU’s shift in trade strategy 
under the 2006 Global Europe. The EU’s long-standing path dependence of 
promoting values, standards and rules according to the principles guiding its external 
action, also served as motivation towards the negotiation of mega-regionals. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that CETA marked the starting point of a new path 
dependence of the EU utilising CETA as a template in its subsequent comprehensive 
agreements. Finally, the role of power asymmetry and bargaining has been 
discussed. While there is less power asymmetry in the EU’s bilateral relations with large 
countries (such as the US, Japan, Canada), this bilateral approach allows for more 
room to achieve deeper mutual concessions. In a nutshell, “mega-regionals can go 
more comprehensive, deeper and faster than the WTO”. 177  The EU was thus 
motivated by the possibility of not only achieving deep economic benefits, but also 
of promoting issues such as climate, labour standards or corporate governance. 
 
The EU-Japan case study presented further motivations that are case-specific to the 
EPA. Particular focus was placed on explaining the role of previous mega-regional 
negotiations ‒ TTIP, TPP, CETA ‒ as critical junctures for the EU-Japan EPA. Insights on 
the importance of sequence were given with regard to the EU-South Korea FTA and 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Against the geopolitical background of a 
decoupling between the US and China, a further reason behind the conclusion of 
the EU-Japan EPA is the need to counteract the rise of protectionism and promote 
an open, rules-based trading system. Finally, bargaining and power asymmetries 
were used as factors to explain how the EU succeeded in including pioneering 
provisions in the EPA. 
 
The likely implications of mega-regionals include positive feedback effects for the 
partners and for the global ‘spaghetti bowl’ of trade agreements. Domino effects 
and possible discriminatory effects for third countries were discussed, along with 
unintended consequences, focussing especially on the rise of protectionism, as well 
                                                 
177 Akman, op. cit., p. 90. 
Tatiana Kakara 
 32 
as on Brexit. Finally, with regard to the potential impacts of mega-regionals on the 
multilateral trading system, unintended consequences such as mega-regionals 
weakening multilateralism were discussed. It was concluded that mega-regionals are 
not to replace the WTO but should be constructed with an open architecture that 
would allow them to become building blocks towards the evolution of the multilateral 
trading system.  
 
The discussion presented in this work is not exhaustive, as further motivations and 
implications of mega-regionals certainly exist. The decision to focus on the ones 
mentioned above is largely based on the choice to discuss geopolitical and 
institutional changes over time through the lens of historical institutionalism.  
 
To date, the EU remains on this ambitious path and hopes to add to the already rich 
network of preferential trade agreements in the future.178 Nonetheless, as the EU is 
one of the biggest trading entities in the world, bilateral agreements with smaller 
countries will in all likelihood also remain a parallel strategy, as the EU can exert more 
bargaining power.179 What is more, perhaps more pressing than the impact of mega-
regionals are a different set of challenges identified above, namely the low trade 
growth and the public opinion turned against global trade, as well as the weakening 
of multilateral institutions coupled with the rise of protectionism and increased state 
intervention.180 Moreover, the Covid-19 emergency health crisis came to add to this 
already challenging moment for trade. The EU clearly expressed commitment to use 
trade, its “main geopolitical instrument of influence in the global economy”, as the 
“only non-budgetary instrument to get us out of the crisis”.181 Within this complex 
environment for trade policy, the EU remains committed to setting ambitious 
standards together with like-minded partners, with agreements with partners such as 
Australia and New Zealand being currently negotiated. Inducing further countries to 
follow suit on this path and finding ways to ensure that the advanced standards set 
bilaterally ultimately also find their way into the multilateral trading system of the WTO 
remain two of the key challenges and open questions for the future existence of 
mega-FTAs.  
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